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REDISCOVERING NONJUSTICIABILITY:
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
IMPEACHMENTS AFfER NIXON
MICHAEL

J. GERHARDTt

INTRODUCTION

Few constitutional canons are criticized more often than the
political question doctrine. It has been called "deceptive,"1 "unwarranted,"2 "an enigma,"3 "useless,"4 and "mixed up and inconsistent."5 The fact that in the thirty years after the Supreme Court
set forth the modern political question doctrine6 it found only one
such question7 and did not identify any in fourteen other cases8

t Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and
Mary. B.A. Yale University; M.Sc. London School of Economics; J.D. University of Chicago. This Article was prepared as part of a study I conducted under contract as a special consultant to the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal. Although
the analysis does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission members or staff, I
am grateful to the Commission members and staff, especially Director Michael
Remington, for their probing questions and helpful suggestions, all of which enriched my
thinking. I am also grateful for the helpful comments and other assistance I have received from Rebecca Brown, Cynthia Farina, Jill Fisch, Peter Shane, Steve Shiffrin, and
Ron Wright.
1. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale LJ. 597, 622
(1976).
2. Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the
Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 397 (1983}.
3. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1031, 1031 (1985).
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.6, at 127 (1989}.
5. Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other
Nixon v. United States, 1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 153.
6. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962}.
7. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1973}.
8. See Department of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415, 1425-26 (1992); Unit-
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confirmed doubts about the doctrine's viability. In 1993, when the
Supreme Court in Nixon v. United States9 found that a challenge
to the Senate's use of a special committee to do factfinding for an
impeachment trial posed a political question, there was therefore
reason to consider the decision a milestone in constitutional law.
Yet, the response to Nixon has been either condemnation10 or
silence.
This reaction is troubling.. The silence might reflect a begrudging or widespread acceptance of a practice as old as the
Constitution of conducting federal impeachments without subsequent judicial review. On the other hand, condemnation might
suggest that the faith of many constitutional law scholars in
judicial review may be so deep-seated that they are not prepared
to deal with the implications of a revived political question doctrine even if it were limited to the context of impeachment.11
In fact, Nixon· is significant for two reasons. First, it breathed
life back into the much-maligned political question doctrine, comprising the Court's practice of claiming textual authority, separation of powers concerns, and prudential reasons for not deciding
the merits of certain constitutional questionsY In doing so, the
Court took a position on an issue-the justiciability of impeachment challenges-that had long divided constitutional scholed States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-96 (1990); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95,
102 (1989); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30
(1986); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986); County of Oneida v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248-50 (1985); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983);
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977): Elrod v. Bums,
427 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1976) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 11 (1975); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-49 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964);
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1964).
9. 113 s. Ct. 732, 740 (1993).
10. Brown, supra note 5, at 126 (criticizing Nixon for not respecting judicial review
as an integral part of a meaningful separation of powers doctrine to protect judicial independence and individual rights).
11. This attitude was evident in the bulk of the commentary written in the months
just prior to Nixon urging the Court to treat challenges to impeachment procedures as
justiciable. See, e.g., David 0. Stewart, Impeachment by Ignorance, A.B.A. J., June 1990,
at 52, 54; Rose Auslander, Note, Impeaching the Senate's Use of Trial Committees, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 68, 68-69 (1992); Brendan C. Fox, Note, Impeachment: The Justiciability
of Challenges to the Senate Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Trials, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1275, 1308-09 (1992); Daniel Luchsinger, Note, Committee Impeachment Trials:
The Best Solution?, 80 GEO. LJ. 163, 164 (1991).
12. See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 2.15 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing the political question doctrine).
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ars13 and is basic for understanding the limits of judicial review.
Nixon was particularly surprising because it was premised on the
Framers' strong distrust of the federal judiciary as an impartial or
competent impeachment authority. Second, Nixon recognized that
in the area of impeachment, Congress may make constitutional
law-i.e., make judgments about the scope and meaning of its
constitutionally authorized impeachment functions-subject to
change only if it later changes its mind or by a constitutional
amendment. Thus, Nixon raised the issue of whether, without
judicial review, Congress is able to make constitutional decisions
in a reasonably principled fashion.
This Article explores these ramifications of Nixon as well as
the most difficult questions it left open about the prospects for
judicial review of impeachment challenges. It aims to show that no
area of constitutional law needs to be nonjusticiable more than
impeachment, that impeachment is the best example of a political
question, because the textual, historical, and structural bases for its
nonjusticiability are stronger than those for any other area, includ-

13. Compare CHARLES BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 53-64 (1974) (arguing
that judicial review of impeachment is inconsistent with the Constitution) and Ronald D.
Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. LJ.
707, 728 (1987-1988) (noting that impeachment raises issues that satisfy each element of
a political question as set forth by the Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962))
with RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 103-21 (1973)
(arguing that constitutional questions, including legislative-executive conflicts, are justiciable) and IRVlNG BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 183-87 (1972) (comparing
judicial review of impeachment and bills of attainder) and Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22
UCLA L. REv. 30 (1974) (arguing that the Burger Court erred in not treating as a
political question President Nixon's asserted claim of executive privilege in the Watergate
tapes case) and John D. Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 57 (1970) (questioning legislative definition of
impeachable offense) and Mark Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and Constitutional Law, 88
MICH. L. REv. 49, 57 (1989) (arguing that Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969),
compels the conclusion that such questions are justiciable).
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ing foreign affairs.14 In other words, impeachment and the political question doctrine make each other possible.
For background, Part I reviews Nixon. Part II explores
Nixon's impact on the status of the political question doctrine.
Part III examines the two major prospects after Nixon for judicial
review of an impeachment challenge. These include limiting judicial review of impeachments altogether and confining it to claims
based on violations of explicit restraints. Part IV makes the case
for barring any judicial review of impeachments. This argument is
based on an analysis of the implications of judicial review of the
most significant impeachment challenges likely to arise in the
future. These potential claims relate to (1) the applicability of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause; (2) the Senate's failure to
comply with procedural rules such as a uniform burden of proof
or set of evidentiary rules; and (3) procedural irregularities in
presidential impeachment trials. Part IV suggests that the nonjusticiability of each of these challenges depends on the fact-not sufficiently emphasized in the literature on impeachment or political
questions-that the Court may not exercise judicial review over an
impeachment because Article III precludes it, i.e., that the Court
has neither original nor appellate jurisdiction over any
impeachment matter. Part IV concludes further that the nonjusticiability of all impeachment challenges is reinforced by the
inextricable link between impeachment and the political question
doctrine as components of the separation of powers.

14. In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the justiciability of foreign
affairs. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND REsPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS
OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFI'ERMATH 55-58 (1993); see THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLmCAL
QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS?

(1992) (arguing that foreign affairs should be justiciable); Linda Champlin & Alan
Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 231 (1985); Redish, supra note 3, at 1052; Michael E. Tigar,
Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17 UCLA L.
REV. 1135, 1152 (1970); Lawrence R. Velvel, The War in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional,
Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. L. REV. 449, 479 (1968). Nevertheless,
the nonjusticiability of foreign affairs is more problematic than that of impeachment,
because neither the text nor the history of the Constitution makes the former the exclusive domain of any one branch, and the Framers never discussed the incompatibility of
judicial involvement with foreign affairs as they did with impeachment.
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I. THE NIXON OPINION

Walter Nixon, a former federal district judge who was convicted of making false statements before ·a federal grand jury, sought
judicial review of his subsequent removal from office by impeachment.15 He challenged the constitutionality of the Senate's use of
a special committee to receive evidence and take testimony regarding his impeachment rather than conducting a full hearing
before the entire Senate.16 His essential claim was that the Senate rule authorizing discretionary use of a special trial committee17 violated the constitutional command in Article I that the
full Senate "try" all impeachments.18 His case required the Court
to consider for the first time the propriety of judicial review of
impeachment proceedings.
Six Justices held Nixon's claim to be nonjusticiable. They
found that the word "try" does not represent an "implied
limitation on the method by which the Senate might proceed in
trying impeachments."19 In their opinion, that word "lacks
sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of
review of the Senate's actions,"20 especially when contrasted with
the three "precise" limitations set out in the Impeachment Trial
Clause21-that Senate members shall "be on Oath or Affirmation," that the Chief Justice shall preside when the President is
tried, and that conviction requires a two-thirds vote of the members present.22 Moreover, other language in the same clause
giving the Senate the "sole" power to try impeachments was held
to constitute a "textual commitment" to a coordinate branch.23
Finally, the Court emphasized that judicial review is inappropriate
for several reasons: it would upset the Framers' decision to allocate to different fora the power to try impeachments and

15.
16.
17.
Cong.,
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993).
Id.
SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE MANuAL, S. Doc. No. 1, lOlst
1st Sess. 183 (1989) (Senate Impeachment Rule XI).
U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736.
Id.
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736.
See id. at 735-36.
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crimes;24 it would disturb the system of checks and balances,
under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the
judiciary;25 and it would create a "lack of finality and [a]
difficulty [in] fashioning relief." 26
The Court distinguished Powell v. McCormack?-1 on the
grounds that it involyed a constitutional provision stating that
"Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members,"28 which is limited by Article
I, Section 2, which "specifies three requirements for membership
in the House: The candidate must be at least 25 years of age, a
citizen of the United States for no less than seven years, and an
inhabitant of the State he is chosen to represent."29 Hence, "[t]he
decision as to whether a member satisfied these qualifications was
placed with the House, but the decision as to what [they] consisted of was not." 30 By contrast, the Impeachment Trial Clause contains no separate provision that "could be defeated by allowing
the Senate final authority to determine the meaning of the word
'try.' ,31
Concurring in the judgment, Justice White, joined by Justice
Blackmun, thought the case presented a justiciable question,
though in his view of the merits the Senate had "very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures,"32 so that as a
practical matter a successful judicial challenge was unlikely. Still,
Justice White believed that proper checks and balances are best
preserved when Senate impeachment trials help control the largely
unaccountable judiciary, "even as judicial review would ensure that
the Senate adher:ed to a minimal set of procedural standards in
conducting impeachment trials." 33 The requirement that the
Senate "try" impeachments creates judicially manageable
standards, which would be violated "[w]ere the Senate, for example, to adopt the practice of automatically entering a judgment of

24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 738.
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 739.
395 u.s. 486 (1969).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739-40.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 741 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 743.
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conviction whenever articles of impeachment were delivered from
the House."34
Concurring separately in the judgment, Justice Souter agreed
with the Couq that the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question, but he thought that the determination should be made
on a case-by-case basis. If the Senate were to convict upon a coin
toss, or upon a summary determination that the official was a
"bad guy" (Justice Souter borrowed this example from Justice
White), "judicial interference might well be appropriate."35
II.

PUTIING NIXON INTO PERSPECTIVE

T_he significance of Nixon is best illustrated by fixing its place
in the development of the political question doctrine. This analysis
demonstrates that Nixon added critical momentum to one side of
the long-standing debate on the constitutional authority for judicial
recognition of political questions. This inquiry also sets the stage
for assessing Nixon's impact on the justiciability of future impeachment challenges.
A. The Origins of the Political Question Doctrine
The Court first recognized the concept of a political question
in Marbury v. Madison. 36 In that case, Chief Justice John Marshall explained that the Constitution invests "the president . . .
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country
in his political character and to his own conscience. . . . The subjects are political.... [B]eing intrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is ~onclusive.'m "Questions in their nature
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to
the executive, can never be made in this court."38 Chief Justice
Marshall contrasted political questions with cases in which
individual rights were at stake; the latter, according to the Court,
never could be political questions.39 Thus, in Chief Justice Mar-

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

ld. at 744.
Id. at 748 (Souter, J., concurring).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch} 137, 165-67 (1803).
Id. at 165.
Id. at 170.
Id.
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shall's opinion, the political question doctrine was narrow: it included only matters over which the President had unlimited
discretion and with respect to which there was consequently no
allegation of a constitutional violation. For example, the Constitution does not constrain the President's choice about whom to
appoint to the federal judiciary.
The ensuing debate over the political question doctrine has
reflected a basic contest over the legitimacy and scope of judicial
review in a democratic society. Among the more notable figures in
this polemic in the twentieth century were Herbert Wechsler and
Alexander Bickel. In the late 1950s, Wechsler argued for an unqualified duty of judicial review in every constitutional case.40 In
his view, the rule of law in this country is coextensive with judicial
review, which is indispensable for the recognition and enforcement
of all constitutional limitations and guarantees. He believed federal
courts should issue opinions on the constitutional allotments of
political discretion and thereby preserve their exclusive function of
constitutional interpretation.41 As Chief Justice Marshall recognized in Marbury, it is the special "province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."42 Thus, for Wechsler,
courts had to interpret the impeachment clauses, like all constitutional provisions, to ensure compliance with the Constitution and
to effectuate the separation of powers.43
In contrast, Bickel contended that the political question doctrine was the culmination of the "passive virtues," the devices that
allow a court to decide when not to decide.44 He explained that
the legitimate exercise of judicial review in a democracy rests to a
significant degree on a court's ability to articulate the "enduring
values" of a soqiety.45 Thus legitimated, courts performing judicial
review undertake not just a "checking function" to keep each of
the elected branches from abridging individual liberties or making
itself stronger at the expense of another branch, but also a "legitimating function," by rallying support for particular legal positions

40. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 13 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (1959).
41. Id. at 7-8.
42. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
43. See Wechsler, supra note 40, at 8.
44. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLmCS 183-97 (2d ed. 1986).
45. Id. at 23-27.
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and by symbolizing the power and continuity of the Constitution
itself.46
Consequently, in Bickel's view, courts must phrase their opinions carefully and know when to stay their hand or remain silent
as they wait for principle to ripen in the face of necessary political
compromise.47 The political question doctrine is just one of a
number of "techniques that allow leeway to expediency without
abandoning principle...48 More precisely, the doctrine comprises
questions about which we believe "that even though there are
applicable rules, these rules should be only among the numerous
relevant considerations.'>49 The possibility of decision on principle
exists, but it must yield to the necessity of national security or the
limits of political consensus.50
At about the same time Bickel published the book in which
he made these arguments, the Court decided Baker v. Carr,51
setting forth the modem test for finding a political question. According to the Court, a political question exists only when a case
involves
on the surface . . . a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.52

The Court concluded that "no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the
ground of a political question's presence, is appropriate without at
least one of these elements.53 The Court also conceded, however,
that "courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 29-33.
See id. at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 185 (citation omitted).
Id. at 186-87.
369 u.s. 186 (1962).
Id. at 217.
Id.
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as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."54
The Court's reluctance over the next thirty years to recognize
political questions fueled criticisms of the doctrine. First, some critics argued that "the political question doctrine should play no role
whatsoever in the exercise of ... judicial review." 55 They contended that the judicial role is to enforce the Constitution, arguing
that matters are placed in the Constitution to insulate them from
majoritarian control and that the political branches should therefore not be trusted to enforce any part of the document meant to
constrain them. Instead, in their view, judicial review exists to
enforce and effectuate the Constitution.
Second, other critics rejected Bickel's depiction of the fragility
of the Court's legitimacy. They maintained that the Court's credibility is resilient, that there is no proof that specific rulings affect
the judiciary's legitimacy, and that the federal courts' mission is to
uphold the Constitution in spite of any adverse political reaction
to its opinions.56
Third, some critics argued that the political question doctrine
confuses deference with abdication. In their view, the finding of a
nonjusticiable political question is a shorthand label for a court's
real conclusion that there was no constitutional violation, or that
the government defendant did not exceed the bounds of the discretionary authority assigned to it by the Constitution.57 For example, in an influential 1976 article, Professor Louis Henkin
claimed to have discovered a trend in which federal courts' findings of political questions

54. Id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 (1983) ("[T]he presence of
constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the
political question doctrine.").
55. Redish, supra note 3, at 1033; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE
CONsriTUTION 99-105 (1987).
56. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55, at 133-38. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONsriTUTIONAL LAw 96-107 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the political question
doctrine).
57. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 601, 605-06; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 55,
at 101-m. Cf. Dellinger, supra note 2, at 397-98, 411 (suggesting that the Court erred in
not finding judicial supervision of amendment process warranted); Fritz W. Scharpf, Judi·
cial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 15 YALE L.J. 517, 566
(1966) (arguing that no principled explanation exists for the Court's political question
cases).
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required no . . . extra-ordinary abstention from judicial review;
they called only for the ordinary respect by the courts for the
political domain. Having reviewed, the Court refused to invalidate the challenged actions because they were within the con~ti
tutional authority of [the] President or Congress.... [It gave]
"effect to what the political branches have done because they
had political authority under the Constitutiou to do it."58

Even with regard to "the unique [textual] instance, '[t]he Senate
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,' " Professor
Henkin claimed that "while the Senate alone is to be the judge in
impeachment proceedings, the courts can review how it does it, at
least for constitutional excesses or infirmities."59
B.

The Status of the Political Question Doctrine in the Aftermath
of Nixon

In dismissing Nixon's challenge to his removal as posing a
nonjusticiable political question, the Nixon Court rejected the traditional critiques of the political question doctrine.60 Even so, nei58. Henkin, supra note 1, at 601 (footnote omitted). In her post-Nixon survey of
political question cases, Professor Brown identifies a different trend. She claims that in
cases in which the Court has dismissed a challenge on political question grounds, the
Court has held
a matter to be nonjusticiable on political-question grounds only where the
standing of the claimant, broadly conceived, or the concreteness of the claim
can itself be said to be questionable or uncertain. When the standing of the
claimant and concreteness of the claimed injury are not in question, the courts
have generally not found adjudication to be precluded by the political-question
doctrine.
Brown, supra note 5, at 144-45.
59. Henkin, supra note 1, at 605 n.26. Another criticism of the political question
doctrine is that Baker v. Carr does not set forth "useful criteria for deciding what subject
matter presents a nonjusticiable political question." CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 2.6, at
126. For example, the text of the Constitution does not state that Congress and the
President should decide whether a particular action constitutes a constitutional violation.
Nor does the Constitution mention judicial review or limit it by creating "textually demonstrable .•. commitment[s]" to other branches of government. Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Similarly, many important constitutional provisions are written in
broad, open-textured langUage and do not entail "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards." Id.
60. In the 1991 Term, the Court set the stage for Nixon by rejecting the suggestion
that a political question existed when, and only when, there was no constitutional violation. See Department of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S. Ct. 1415 (1992). The Court declared that "[i]n invoking the political question doctrine, a court acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional provision may not be judicially enforceable. Such a decision is
of course very different from determining that specific congressional action does not
violate the Constitution." Id. at 1425 (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, the Court in
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ther Nixon nor the doctrine it reaffirmed is immune to attack. In
the most significant attack thus far on Nixon, Professor Rebecca
Brown argues that the separation of powers exists to protect individual rights, that judicial review is an integral part of the separation of powers, and that the Nixon Court should therefore have
"permit[ted] judicial review of the exercise of the impeachment
power" to ensure that no individual right was being violated.61
The individual right at risk in an impeachment is a federal judge's
potential loss of position, including the independence she is otherwise guaranteed by Article III.62
Moreover, the Court did not reconcile the apparent irony of
its reviewing the contours of an area of political decisionmaking to
preserve the area from judicial review in the name of nonjusticiability with its refusal to acknowledge thatJ.ts deference may have
turned on an implicit judgment that the Constitution simply grants
the political actor broad discretion. In addition, the Court's reliance on constitutional and prudential factors 63 in dismissing
Nixon's claim as a "political question" may have cast doubt on the
legitimacy of the Court's inquiry. The concern is that the political
question doctrine may have enlarged the judiciary's role in deciding constitutional questions because it has allowed courts to use
disingenuous analysis to reach certain results or to make constitutional decisions on a basis not clearly linked to the text, structure,
or history of the Constitution.64
There are three responses to these problems. First, the Court
referred to a finding of "nonjusticiab[ility]"-a constitutionally
compelled conclusion barring judgment on a dispute's merits-as
Montana held that the case, which involved the constitutionality of a reapportionment
scheme adopted by Congress for the House of Representatives, was justiciable, because it
was no different from Baker. Id. at 1425-26.
61. Brown, supra note 5, at 138.
62. Id. at 137.
63. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735-40 (1993).
64. Judge Raymond Randolph took this position in Nixon's case before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He characterized the political
question doctrine as "amorphous" and as
ultimately . . • conferring on the courts a rather large role in impeachments
although the Framers intentionally excluded the judiciary•.•. I view the controlling question as whether the judiciary can pass upon the validity of the
Senate's procedural decisions. My conclusion that the courts have no such role
to play in the impeachment process ultimately rests on my interpretation of the
Constitution.
Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph, J., concurring)
(citation omitted), affd, 113 S. Ct. at 732.
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the functional equivalent of discovering a "political question." 65
This reference may reflect a strategic decision to preserve a majority committed to avoiding the merits of the case despite widespread criticism of the political question doctrine. Some Justices
might not have minded that the political question doctrine was
judicially created and allows consideration of the consequences of
judicial review, whereas others might have felt more comfortable
viewing their inquiry as being guided solely by the Constitution's
limits on justiciability. Even so, Nixon emphasized the textual,
historical, and structural arguments supporting the Court's finding
of nonjusticiability.66 The Court also stressed that the term "try"
does not offer "an identifiable textual limit on the authority which
is committed to the Senate." 67
The Court found further that prolonged court battles over an
impeachment would create uncertainty ~bout its finality and as to
"what relief a court may give other than simply settiilg aside the
judgment of the conviction. Could it order the reinstatement of a
convicted federal judge, or order Congress to create an additional
judgeship if the seat had been filled in the interim?" 68 Hence, the
Court's opinion in Nixon relied on prudential concerns related to
the possible consequences of certain constitutional decisions, as
well as on arguments based on the text, structure, and history of
the Constitution. In other words, Nixon did not bury the political
question doctrine; rather, Nixon resuscitated it by clarifying both
its derivation from the Constitution and its sensitivity to the need
for constitutional stability.
Second, the idea that a federal court may have to exercise
some degree of judicial review in order to determine the existence
of a political question is hardly a reason to jettison the entire
enterprise as deceptive or confusing. In explaining his willingness
to reach the merits of Nixon's claim in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Harry Edwards quoted
my observation in 1989 that

65. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735.
66. See id. at 738-40.
67. Id. at 740.
68. Id. at 739; see also id. (expressing concerns that litigation over impeachment

could "expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos")
(quoting Nixon, 938 F.2d at 246).
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[t]he lesson of Powell is that the Supreme Court may use judicial
review to determine whether Congress followed the proper procedure for making the political decision committed to it by the
Constitution. Powell does not allow overly intrusive judicial review, but rather allows review solely to ensure that Congress
made the particular kind of political decision entrusted to it by
the Constitution.69
Judge Edwards proceeded to find that Nixon's challenge required
the appellate court to determine the scope of the term "try" and,
therefore, to reach a ruling on the merits of the lawsuit's contentions?0 Yet, my statement, admittedly not as clear as it should
have been, was meant to support the opposite conclusion. It recognized that in determining whether a case poses a political question,
a court may look to see if Congress is in fact exercising the power
it claims to be. If Congress is using inappropriate means to
achieve a legitimate objective, then further judicial intervention is
permissible. Moreover, in a political question case, a court does
not just look at the contours of a particular area of political decisionmaking and decide to defer to any decision made within that
sphere because it is constitutional; rather, a court exercises judicial
review to determine the scope or boundaries of an area about
whose subject matter it should not express any opinion.
Viewed in this manner, the determination of a political question requires a court to make the kind of decision it must routinely make in adjudicating preliminary issues about the ripeness or
mootness of a lawsuit, personal jurisdiction, and standing. The
obvious consequence of a finding that none of the essential criteria
for a lawsuit to qualify as a case or controversy are present is that
a court dismisses the case without a decision on the merits, even
though in reaching such a conclusion, it must appreciate the nature
of the particular dispute and speculate on the applicability of a
wide variety of constitutional and prudential concerns. The kind of
inquiry required to determine a political question is no less appropriate than any other preliminary inquiry undertaken in a federal
case to determine the propriety of adjudicating its merits.71
69. Nixon, 938 F.2d at 255 n.6 (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its
Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1, 99-100 (1989)).
70. ld. at 255-59.
71. Professor Brown argues that "[t]he interests [the political question doctrine] might
or should serve, such as judicial respect for the processes of the coordinate branches and

1994]

REDISCOVERING NONJUSTICIABILITY

245

To be sure, the distinction is subtle between reaching the
merits of a dispute because it falls within an area over which a
court decides that some political actor has extensive constitutional
authority and not reviewing the substantive merits of a political
actor•s decision because it is within a sphere about which a court
may not express any opinion.72 Nevertheless, a finding of nonjusticiability is not disingenuous, result-oriented, or a substitute for a
court•s admission of weakness. Such a finding is different from a
court•s deciding that a wide realm of governmental behavior is
constitutional in that a determination of nonjusticiability forecloses
a range of potential litigation and signals once and for all that

efficient use of judicial capital, can be protected adequately by thoughtful adherence to
the principles of standing." Brown, supra note 5, at 127. She suggests that in determining
whether a particular case actually involves a political question, the Court has relied on
standing criteria, "including allegation[s] of injury, causation, and redressability by the
courts" and that when these factors were present, the Court had declined to find a political question, until Nixon. Id. at 154; see also supra note 52.
Professor Brown's proposal is problematic for three reasons. First, her determination that the results of the Court's political question cases would not have been any
different had the Court used the right ·analysis, with the possible exception of Nixon,
casts doubt on the extent to which her suggestion would clarify the law of either the
political question doctrine or standing. Brown, supra note 5, at 154. She suggests that her
proposal would make constitutional law more lucid, id. at 126-27, but the standing doctrine has long been as harshly criticized as the political question doctrine for being easily
manipulated and result-oriented. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 2.3, at 48-49. Second, she never explains how Nixon would have been decided differently under her notion
of the right approach. Near the beginning of her article, she argues that "[t]he Court
would have more faithfully effectuated the constitutional design by permitting judicial
review of the Senate action, even while perhaps granting substantial deference on the
merits." Brown, supra note 5, at 127. At the end of her article, she suggests there was
"a clear claim to standing" in Nixon. Id. at 154. Yet, the source of her deference is not
clear, especially given the possible involvement of an individual right. Nor does she explain how Nixon might have had standing but still had to lose on the merits. The problem is that it is unclear how her analysis clarifies constitutional law any more than an
alternative approach under which one would accept the political question doctrine but
find a judicially manageable standard by which to resolve the case. Cf. Nixon, 113 S. Ct.
at 74~5 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the word "try" in U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 2,
cl. 6 provides a judicially manageable standard for resolving the case). Third, Professor
Brown's approach allows for greater judicial interference with the impeachment process
than the original understanding and structure of the Constitution permit. See infra notes
79-83 and accompanying text.
72. Cf. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 741 (White, J., concurring):
It will likely make little difference whether the Court's or my view controls this
case. This is so because the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate
would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed
a trial by reasonable judges.
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there is no judicial remedy available for any official misconduct
within a certain area.
Of course, a federal court needs constitutional authority to
dismiss a constitutional case permanently without a ruling on its
merits. Accordingly, the third argument favoring the political question doctrine is that the Constitution demands such a result. If the
national government in fact is, as Chief Justice Marshall observed
in M'Culloch v. Maryland,13 one of "enumerated powers,"74 then
it should follow that the federal judiciary is, like the other branches, subject to certain constraints, even self-imposed ones. Yet,
many of the critics of the political question doctrine seem uncomfortable with having any branch other than the judiciary declare
what the Constitution means; they would prefer that federal judges
have the final say on the constitutional limitations of every governmental action. No decision more clearly indicates the fallacy of
this notion, however, than Nixon. It recognized that the Constitution limits even federal judicial power. In other words, it may be
the special duty of federal courts to "say what the law is,"75 but
sometimes the law is that it is improper for a court to decide the
merits of a particular constitutional issue.
Nor does the Constitution necessarily support the notion that
it has meaning only as long as the judiciary is empowered to enforce all of its guarantees or limits. Judicial review may be necessary to make the enforcement and vindication of various federal
rights and limitations possible, but that acknowledgment does not
establish a constitutional basis for judicial review over every case
or controversy implicating the Constitution.
For example, the constitutional basis for not reaching the
merits of Nixon's claim underscores the textual, historical, and
structural grounds for a court's finding a political question. As the
Nixon Court acknowledged, judicial review over impeachment procedures frustrates the original constitutional scheme in which the
Framers foresaw impeachment as the only political check on the
judiciary.76 The Court observed further that the parties had not
offered "evidence of a single word in the history of the Constitutional Convention or in contemporary commentary that even al-

73. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
74. /d. at 405.
75. Scharpf, supra note 57, at 518.
76. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736.
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ludes to the possibility of judicial review in the context of the
impeachment powers.'m The Court found this "silence" revealing,
because it is at odds with "the several explicit references to the
availability of judicial review as a check on the Legislature's power
with respect to bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and statutes."78
Moreover, the Framers expressed several reasons for excluding
any role for federal judges as decisionmakers in the impeachment.
process. The Framers wanted the body empowered to try impeachments to be sufficiently numerous and to have suffiCient fortitude
and public accountability to make the necessary policy choices in
an impeachment.79 The Framers also designed the impeachment
process to protect the target of an impeachment from being punished for the same offense twice by preventing judges from being
able to administer or oversee both an individual's impeachment
trial and separate criminal proceeding.80 Moreover, the Framers
sought to preclude the "eviscerat[ion]" of impeachment as an
"'important constitutional check' placed on the Judiciary,"81
which would result from placing the "final reviewing authority with
respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the
impeachment process is meant to regulate," and to fashion explicit .
"constitutional safeguards to keep the Senate in check." 82 These
protections, including dividing impeachment authority between the ·
House and the Senate and "the two-thirds supermajority vote
requirement" for a conviction, are sufficient to prevent the Senate
from "usurp[ing] judicial power." 83 In short, the relevant constitutional text, structure, and history do· not support judicial review of
the procedural aspects of the constitutionally recognized process
for judicial removal.
Thus, an important lesson of Nixon is that constitutional authority does not exist for judicial review of every instance in which
there is a constitutional dispute or that the absence of such authority reasonably counsels or supports a finding of nonjusticiabil-

77. Id. at 737.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 738.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 739 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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ity. Even so, the next Part considers the potential justiciability of
various impeachment challenges in light of Powell and Nixon and
the subject matter not addressed by those cases.
III. THE PROSPECI'S FOR JUSTICIABLE IMPEACHMENT
CHALLENGES IN THE AFTERMATH OF NIXON

After Nixon, two possibilities exist for judicial review of impeachment challenges. Th~ first is that the only justiciable challenges to impeachments are for violations of explicit constraints,
while the second is that judicial review is never permissible. I
explore below the implications of each prospect.

A. Treating Violations of Explicit Constraints as Justiciable
One possibility after Nixon is that the only justiciable challenges to the impeachment process are for violations of explicit
constitutional restraints on impeachment. In Nixon, for example,
the Court explained that it exercised judicial review in Powel/ 84
to overturn the House's decision not to seat Adam Clayton Powell
as a representative based on his financial misconduct, because the
House's claim that
its power to [be the judge of its members' qualifications] was a
textual commitment of unreviewable authority was defeated by
the existence of [a] separate provision specifying the only qualifications which might be imposed for House membership. The
decision as to whether a member satisfied these qualifications
was placed with the House, but the decision as to what these
qualifications consisted of was not. 85

The Nixon Court held, however, that a separate constitutional provision did not defeat the Senate's power to "try" impeachments as
it saw fit. 86 Yet, the Court identified four explicit constitutional
constraints on the impeachment power: the division of impeachment authority between the House and the Senate, the two-thirds
vote requirement in the Senate for a conviction, the requirement
of the members of the Senate to be under oath, and the dictate
that the Chief Justice shall preside in a presidential impeachment

-84. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
85. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740.
86. ld.
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trial.87 A court looking for the impeachment analogue to the provision enforced in Powell may find justiciable the failure to comply
with any of these explicit constraints on the impeachment process,
because they each conceivably "defeat[]" the discretion the House
and the Senate otherwise are constitutionally authorized to exercise in discharging their respective impeachment functions. 88
If violations of explicit impeachment restraints are justiciable,
it is not difficult to conclude that the four restraints identified by
the Nixon majority are indeed justiciable.89 Conversely, the
hypotheticals of concern to Justices White, Blackmun, and
Souter-the Senate's tossing of a coin90 and its summary determination that an impeachable official was "a bad guy"91-are conceivably not justiciable. These hypotheticals merely suppose that in
the extreme cases the Senate is still exercising some judgment-albeit poor-in an impeachment proceeding. Even then, the
political accountability of senators and the three explicit limitations
on Senate proceedings mentioned by the Court act separately and
together to make the situations posed in these hypotheticals unlikely and to safeguard against their being undertaken lightly. By
holding that "try" does not establish any judicially "identifiable
textual limit"92 on the impeachment process, the Nixon Court did
not identify any constitutional basis on which the Court may interfere with the Senate's irresponsible conduct even at the extreme
(at least in the absence of a violation of an explicit command).
Moreover, the Court's concerns about preserving the "finality" of
impeachment decisions and "fashioning" appropriate "relief' cut
against any judicial interference.93 Hence, Nixon reveals something significant about the political question doctrine-that it al-

87. See id. at 736, 739.
88. See id. at 740.
89. See id. at 736, 739. Yet, this simplicity could be illusory. Cf. infra notes 176-91
and accompanying text (arguing that the constraints on impeachment are evidence of its
uniqueness).
90. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 748 (Souter, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 741 (White, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 740 (majority opinion).
93. Id. at 739. Professor Brown fails to address not only the degree to which either
of these factors undercuts her case for judicial review of impeachments but also the fact
that her alternative proposal to substitute standing analysis for the political question doctrine acknowledges the propriety of a federal court's deciding to avoid ruling on the
merits of a claim because of the difficulties of fashioning appropriate relief. See Brown,
supra note 5, at 144.
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lows the Court to stand by silently while the Senate exercises very
poor judgment-whereas a holding that would have deferred
broadly to the Senate's actions as long as they were reasonable
would have allowed judicial review of all impeachments to ensure
that the Senate never acted foolishly or recklessly.
The text and the structure of the Constitution may also be
read as establishing other impeachment constraints ignored by the
Court but still of sufficient clarity that their violations arguably
might be justiciable. One example is the need for the House to
have a majority to impeach. Moreover, the clause limiting the
Senate's discretion by allowing it to impose after a conviction only
the punishments of removal and disqualification94 clearly restrains
it from imposing any other sanction, such as confinement or death.
Similarly, Congress's impeachment authority is to be exercised only
against the President, the Vice President, and "all civil Officers of
the United States," 95 obviously precluding the House or Senate
from exercising its respective impeachment power over a private
citizen who has never worlced a day in government service.96
Sometimes, however, a constraint is not amenable to judicial
enforcement or has indeterminate justiciable limits. For example,
one check on the impeachment power is the ballot box, i.e., the
political accountability of members of Congress, which is obviously
left up to voters rather than courts to enforce.
Another constraint is that Congress may impeach and convict
an impeachable official only for committing an impeachable offense,97 such that someone could conceivably claim a justiciable
violation if he were convicted and removed from office for behavior that was well within his legitimate authority and not offensive
in any way to the public's trust (such as a president's decision to
send his child to a private rather than a public school). But in

94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 ("Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.").
95. Id. art. II, § 4.
96.

See PETER CHARLES HOfFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA,

1635-1805, at 97 (1984) (suggesting that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
"never wavered" from their agreement to limit impeachment only to officeholders, and
therefore to differentiate the federal impeachment process from the English practice under which anyone, except a member of the royal family, could be impeached).
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
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other cases, such as impeaching a federal judge for hiring only
white male law clerks, it is difficult to settle on judicially manageable standards, because the existence of an impeachable offense
depends inexorably on Congress's political judgment and on the
particular circumstances of the alleged impeachable offense involved.98 This complication is explored in more detail in the next
Section, because it supports a broader, if not absolute, rule against
the justiciability of impeachment challenges, given the concerns
about finality, fashioning appropriate relief, and separation of
powers that are implicated in any lawsuit challenging the impeachment process.
B. The Nonjusticiability of Any Impeachment Challenge

A second, more extreme reading of Nixon is that no challenge
to the impeachment process is justiciable. This construction depends on much of the same historical and structural understanding
that supported Nixon. Indeed, many of the same separation of
powers concerns that led the Nixon Court to treat procedural
challenges to the Senate's trial process as nonjusticiable would be
present in a case involving alleged violations of the explicit constraints on the impeachment process. For example, the Court in
Nixon thrice emphasized that the unique function of the impeachment process as the only legislative check on the judiciary would
be "eviscerate[d]" by judicial review. 99 This threat does not dissipate, at least in the case of judicial review of a judicial impeachment, even if an explicit constraint is involved.
Nevertheless, Professor Brown criticizes Nixon for being based
on the erroneous presumption that "judicial review of [impeachment] procedures is equivalent to judicial determination of out98. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 82-89 (describing the scope of impeachable offenses).
·
99. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 739 (1993); see id. ·at 738 (stating that
"impeachment was designed to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the Legislature," such that judicial review of impeachments would be "inconsistent with the Framers'
insistence that our system be one of checks and balances"); id. at 739 (observing that
judicial review of Nixon's challenge "would eviscerate the 'important constitutional check'
placed on the Judiciary by the Framers" and that ''Nixon's argument would place final
reviewing authority with respect to impeachments in the hands of the same body that the
impeachment process is meant to regulate") (citation omitted); id. at 739 n.2 (distinguishing Nixon from two other separation of powers cases, neither of which "involved a situation in which judicial review would remove the only check placed on the Judicial Branch
by the Framers").
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come."100 There are several problems with this critique. It ignores the fact that the effectiveness of impeachment as the only
political check on judicial abuse of power is weakened if it can be
reviewed by the judiciary. Judicial review of the impeachment process would give judges the last word on the propriety of the procedures for their own removals, and thus the chance to make such
removals virtually impossible by demanding that Congress achieve
them only through the most complex, time-consuming ways. The
risk of self-interested judicial review of judicial impeachments is
minimal only if, like Professor Brown, one trusts the judiciary
more than Congress not to abuse its respective authority over impeachments.101
The problem is that the Framers disagreed. In fact, the Framers believed that the special constraints on the exercise of the
impeachment power, such as the political accountability of members of Congress and the division of impeachment authority between the House and the Senate, were meant to be a "complete
security" against its abuse. 102 Moreover, it is significant, given
their concerns about the possible conflicts of interest resulting
from authorizing different bodies to try impeachments, that the
Framers never mentioned, much less explored, the dilemmas posed
by subjecting impeachments to judicial review.103
In any event, the same arguments the Framers had for vesting
federal impeachment power solely in Congress and not placing it
in the federal judiciary led the Nixon Court to treat Nixon's challenges as nonjusticiable104 and support forgoing judicial review of
any aspects of an impeachment trial. Some of the prudential concerns-particularly "the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashBrown, supra note 5, at 129.
ld. at 138-39.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 81, at 545-46.
See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 737; see also BLACK, supra note 13, at 59, 61:
So far as I can find, not one syllable pronounced or written in or around
the time of the adoption of the Constitution gives the faintest color to the
supposition that the Supreme Court [or the lower courts were] expected to have
anything to do with impeachments, or the trial thereof, or appeals thereon.

100.
101.
102.
103.

[Nor is there] a shred of affirmative historical evidence that the Framers
and ratifiers of the Constitution ever thought for one moment that the lower
courts were to deal with impeachment questions. It is quite incredible, given the
great amount of attention paid to impeachment procedure, that this possibility
never would have been mentioned, if in fact it had been thought a serious
possibility.
104. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 737-40.
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ioning relief'-that "counsel[ed] against justiciability" in Nixon 105
also apply to situations in which explicit impeachment constraints
are violated.106 Significantly, the Nixon Court used examples
from presidential and judicial impeachments to explain how these
prudential factors supported a finding of nonjusticiability.107
Given the unsettling prospect of an explicit constitutional
violation without a judicial remedy, it may be helpful to exatnine
more closely the degree to which the factors used for identifying a
political question support the lack of any judicial review of an
impeachment. Of special concern may be the extent to which
judicial review is inappropriate in those cases-e.g., presidential
impeachments-in which a conflict between the judiciary and the
political process constitutionally authorized for its regulation is not
present. In such cases, it is particularly interesting that while the
text of the Constitution does not clearly support finding explicit
violations to be nonjusticiable, constitutional structure and history
plainly do.
In fact, Article I states that the House "shall have the sole
Power of hnpeachment" 108 and that the Senate "shall have the
sole Power to Try all Impeachments."109 Moreover, the Speech
or Debate Clause110 has been interpreted to preclude judicial review of the legitimate activities of legislators acting within their
official duties, including impeachment. 111 However, these provisions do not necessarily preclude judicial review, because there
may be other judicially enforceable limitations on the impeachment
power.112
·
105. Id. at 739.
106. For two commentaries urging a similar conclusion prior to Nixon, see Gerhardt,
supra note 69, at 97-101; Rotunda, supra note 13, at 728-32.
107. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
109. Id. § 3, cl. 6.
110. See id. § 6, cl. 1:
The Senators and Representatives shall . . . in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not
be questioned in any other Place.
111. See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501-07
(1975); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624-25 (1972); United States v. Johnson,
383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966); see also In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials, 833
F.2d 1438, 1446 (11th Cir. 1987).
112. Nor is the textual support for nonjusticiability settled by the provision in U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
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For example, the Court in Nixon recognized that
the concept of a textual commitment [of an issue] to a coordinate political department is not completely separate from the
concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards
may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.113

Applying this principle to Nixon's challenge, the Court determined,
after reviewing the general understanding of the term "try" in
1787114 and its modem usage,115 that the word lacks "sufficient
precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review of
the Senate's actions [in an impeachment trial.]"116 The Court
found further that this construction was
fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements
that the Constitution does impose on the Senate when trying
impeachments: the members must be under oath, a two-thirds
vote is required to convict, and the Chief Justice presides when
the President is tried. These limitations are quite precise, and
their nature suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose
additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings by
the use of the word "try" in the impeachment trial clause.117

Thus, Nixon could be read as treating violations of explicit constraints as presenting judicially discoverable and manageable stan-

ings." AI. the Court observed over a century ago,
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method
of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the house, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate or even more just. • . . [This
rulemaking power is,] within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal.
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
113. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. a. 732, 735 (1993),
114. ld. at 736 ("Older dictionaries define try as '[t]o examine' or '[t]o examine as a
judge.'" (quoting 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF TifE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
'(1785))).
115. ld. ("In more modern usage the term has various meanings. For example, try can
mean 'to examine or investigate judicially,' 'to conduct the trial of,' or 'to put to the test
by experiment, investigation, or trial.'" (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2457 (1981))).
116. ld.
117. ld.
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dards of review, unlike the term "try," because those constraints
specifically spell out the terms of their enforcement.
Other aspects of the Constitution, however, counsel against
the justiciability of explicit constitutional violations in the impeachment context. First, treating impeachments as nonreviewable is
consistent with the Constitutional Convention delegates' deliberate
decision to exclude any role for the courts in an impeachment,
except for providing that the Chief Justice should preside at the
impeachment trial of the President.118 The Framers also believed,
not insignificantly, that judges might be influenced by the difficult
conflict of interest of impeaching the person who had appointed
them or their fellow judges.119 Moreover, the Framers substituted
the Chief Justice for the Vice President in the impeachment trial
of a President to preclude the Vice President from presiding over
the impeachment trial of the one official standing between him
and the presidency.120 Given the Framers' efforts to avoid conflicts of interest in the administration of the impeachment process,
it is implausible that if the Framers had accepted judicial review of
impeachments, they would have failed to comment on the obvious
conflicts posed by placing the Chief Justice in the position of being
able to participate in the subsequent review of his decisions as the
presiding officer of a presidential impeachment trial. Given the
strong objections to the proposed impeachment process in the
Constitutional Convention and state ratifying conventions,121 it is
likely that if anyone had expected judicial review of impeachments,
· he would have objected to or commented on potential conflicts
with the Chief Justice's role.
Even as staunch a friend of judicial review as Justice
Story122 rejected its exercise over impeachments. He explained

118. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 500, 551 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966).
119. Id. at 398-99.
120. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 98.
121. See BERGER, supra note 13, at 116-17.
122. See generally Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Introduction to JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES viii-ix (Ronald
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833):
Story understood that federal courts would be crucial to the enforcement of
federal law. Indeed, Story suggested in his scholarly writings and in case dictum
that Congress had a constitutional duty to extend the jurisdiction of lower federal courts in a way that would guarantee protection of the supremacy of the
federal law. Whenever possible, Story would vote to extend the jurisdiction of
federal courts.
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that the Framers viewed Congress as better equipped than the
judiciary to deal with the difficult political issues raised in impeachments.123 He noted that the Framers rejected giving the impeachment power to the judiciary because they believed that impeachment required "a very large discretion [that] must unavoidably be vested in the court of impeachments."124 Justice Story
explained further that the Framers understood the power of impeachment as inherently political and therefore vested the power
solely with the House of Representatives, "where it should be, in
the possession and power of the immediate representatives of the
people."125 He also regarded the sanctions available to the Senate in impeachment trials as "peculiarly fit[ting] for a political tribunal to administer, and as will secure the public against political
injuries."126
Second, impeachment decisions are laced with issues incompatible with judicial review. For example, the House and the Senate
eventually must agree, usually independently of each other, on
what constitutes an impeachable offense.127 The Framers expected that these judgments would be guided not by indictable crimes
but rather by amorphous notions of injury to the republic. This
expectation is reflected in the references of the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention to impeachable offenses as "great"
offenses in contrast to indictable ones128 and of the delegates at
the state ratifying conventions to the propriety of impeaching any
official who "deviates from his duty" 129 or "dare[s] to abuse the
powers vested in him by the people."130

123. STORY, supra note 122, § 396, at 280.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 407, at 290.
126. Id.
127. See Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 84 (noting that historically impeachment has been
understood as a "political proceeding and impeachable offenses as essentially political
crimes.").
128. See BERGER, supra note 13, at 88 ("James Iredell, later a Supreme Court Justice,
told the North Carolina Convention [during the ratification campaign] that the 'occasion
for its exercise [impeachment] will arise from acts of great injury to the community.'"
(citation omitted} (second alteration in original)).
129. 4 THE DEBATES IN TilE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON TilE ADOPTION OF
TilE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 47 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836} (quoting William
Maclaine of North Carolina).
130. 2 id. at 169 (quoting Samuel Stillman of Massachusetts).
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Alexander Hamilton echoed such sentiments in The Federalist,
observing that
[t]he subjects of [Senate] jurisdiction [in an impeachment trial]
are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
men, or in other words from the abuse or violation of some
public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to
injuries done immediately to the society itself. 131

James Wilson, who served as a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention and to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention and later
as a Supreme Court Justice, agreed that impeachable offenses covered "political crimes.''132 Similarly, as Justice Story observed, impeachable offenses are "purely of a political nature''133 and defy
classification by statute. No statutes or common law sets forth the
impeachable offenses that courts may interpret or apply. Hamilton
viewed this circumstance as precluding strict rules of the sort
courts commonly apply and requiring instead a large, politically accountable body to exercise the "awful discretion" necessary for
formulating impeachable offenses.134 Thus, there are no reliable
or clear standards against which a federal court can measure the
propriety of Congress's judgment on whether certain misconduct
constitutes an impeachable political crime.
Third, as the Nixon Court acknowledged,135 judicial review
of impeachments undermines their finality. Judicial review might
also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the
federal judiciary. Allowing the Chief Justice to participate in the
judicial review of a President's impeachment trial over which the
Chief Justice had presided would obviously be awkward. More
importantly, it would be confusing and embarrassing and risk serious political instability at home and abroad if the Senate voted to

131. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 439 {Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
132. 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of PennsylvaniaOf the Legislative Department, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 399, 426 (Robert G.
McQoskey ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Press of Harvard University Press, 1967)
(1804).
133. STORY, supra note 122, § 406, at 289.
134. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 131, at 441.
135. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 739 {1993).
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remove the President and then a federal court countermanded that
judgment.136
Yet, compl~tely precluding judicial review because of these
consequences seemingly conflicts with Powell. After all, Powell
suggested, as the Nixon Court noted,137 that when a constitutional provision plainly restricts the discretion of another branch, a
court may intervene to enforce compliance.138 Powell did not involve what the Nixon Court recognized as "a situation in which
judicial review would remove the only check placed on the Judicial
Branch by the Framers."139 Of course, judicial review of presidential impeachments does not pose a similar conflict, because as
a group, judges are not likely to have much, if any, vested interest
in the President's remaining in office. Nevertheless, some judges
may feel loyal to the President because he appointed them. In
short, Powell did not deal with the propriety of judicial review of
a power the Framers chose not to give to the judiciary because
they felt judges could not be trusted with it.
Yet another basis on which to distinguish Powell, either apart
from or in addition to the uniqueness of impeachment, is that
Powell has not been properly understood. One could argue that
the real problem for the House in Powell was that none of its
existing powers for disciplining current or prospective members fit
Powell's alleged financial improprieties. The House's expulsion
authority required a representative to have been seated and the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of the House;140 however,
many members were not sure if an expulsion could be based on
misconduct committed during a prior Congress, as would have
been the case for Powell's infractions, and even if the House had
such power, they were not sure they had the requisite number of
votes. 141 The other alternative-and the one chosen by the
House-was to exclude Powell, but this authority turned on
Powell's not having met the three standing qualifications for
House membership. Although more than two-thirds of the House
voted to exclude Powell, they did so only pursuant to a vote on
exclusion. The Court refused to assume that the vote would have
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id.
/d. at 740.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969).
Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739 n.2.
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5.
See Powell, 395 U.S. at 508-12.
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been the same if it had been on the question of expulsion, which
the Court noted was not a "fungible proceeding[]" with exclusion.142 Because the House chose to exercise its exclusion rather
than its expulsion power, the Court declined to express any "view
on what limitations may exist on Congress' power to expel or
otherwise punish a member once he has been seated. " 143 In his
concurrence, Justice Douglas speculated that
if this were an expulsion case I would think that no justiciable
controversy would be presented, the vote of the House being
two-thirds or more. But it is not an expulsion case. Whether it
could have been won as an expulsion case, no one knows. . . . It
well might be easier to bar admission than to expel one already
seated.144

In short, the House faced a no-win situation in trying to punish
Powell because his alleged misconduct fell outside of the existing
House disciplinary mechanisms.
This understanding of Powell could lead one to argue, as I
have previously, that the Court there
could [probably] not have interfered with the decision by [the
House] to expel Representative Powell if [it] had followed the
constitutional standards for expulsion; however, the Court could
step in where Congress used a procedure to accomplish impermissible ends. Powell indicates that while [the House] has full,
complete, and sole power to exclude, it does not have the power
to change expulsion into exclusion-to tum one constitutional
procedure into another.145
Given this understanding of Powell, judicial review of impeachments would be limited to determining whether the House or
the Senate used impeachment to do something that it could do
only under some other power, such as exclusion or expulsion.146

142. Id. at 512.
143. Id. at 507 n.27.
144. Id. at 553 (Douglas, J., concurring).
145. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 100 (citations omitted).
146. One could go further to argue that the Court in Powell was mistaken in its
conclusion that "the qualifications for members of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution." Powell, 395 U.S. at 540. One could contend that these qualifications are fixed
only as to the House but not as to the states or that they constitute only an irreducible
minimum to which the House, Congress, or the states each could make an addition, if it
chose to do so. See Robert C. DeCarli, Note, The Constitutionality of State-Enacted Term
Limits Under the Qualification Clauses, 71 TEx. L. REv. 865, 866 (1993).
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One problem with the latter reading of Powell, though, is that
it does not preclude judicial review of impeachments altogether. It
preserves judicial review for what would be extremely unlikely
abuses of the impeachment power, but it implicitly accepts that all
congressional powers have judicially enforceable limits, at least at
the point at which one power is being improperly substituted for
or being exercised in the place of another. Powell arguably followed this line of reasoning by suggesting that exclusion and expulsion could be used by the House for different purposes and
that the bases for the House's exclusion of Powell did not fit within the scope of that particular power.
For many, an even more serious problem with an attempt to
preclude all judicial review of impeachments is that it seems unlikely that the Court ever would agree to abdicate an entire area
of constitutional law to another branch. This is especially true with
respect to checks and balances; in almost every other situation in
which the Constitution allows one branch to check another's excesses or abuses, the Court has taken the position as a mediator,
albeit sometimes with very limited authority. For example, the
Court has never characterized congressional control of federal
jurisdiction as involving a political question. Moreover, some of
the areas in which the Court has found a political question, such
as determining the appropriate time period for ratification of a
constitutional amendmentl 47 or whether a state government is
republican in form, 148 are not as subject (at least as clearly) as
the impeachment power to defeat by other plainly applicable
clauses, such as the requirement of a supermajority vote for a
conviction. Even in other areas often treated by scholars as comprising or involving nonjusticiable political questions, such as foreign affairs, the Constitution either provides no clear standards by
which to measure the propriety of a branch's political judgment
(such as whether the situation declared to be a war by Congress
was one) or explicitly provides for the involvement of more than
one branch, which has in the past given rise to confusion among
the political branches as to whose authority should govern and the
need for the Court to act as arbiter. 149

147. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
148. See Pacific Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 1 (1849).
149. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Baldridge, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (declining to
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There are two tenable responses to the reluctance to abandon
any judicial review of impeachments. First, the Court has yet to
find an impeachment challenge to be justiCiable. Regardless of
what one thinks is the need for judicial review of impeachment
challenges, the Court has never sanctioned it. Thus, as a practical
matter, the Court has left the federal impeachment process for
over two centuries to .the complete, unreviewable discretion of the
Congress.
Second, the most worrisome kinds of impeachment abuses
have yet to occur. Even if one were inclined to find the need for
judicial review of impeachment challenges in extreme cases, the
likelihood of such controversies ever arising is, for all practical
purposes, nonexistent. If one were truly interested in knowing
what Congress is likely to do with its impeachment authority in
the absence of judicial review, one need look no further than the
pages of history. They do not contain any of the nightmarish episodes imagined by proponents of judicial review of the impeachment process. Moreover, many of the constitutional restraints
on Congress's impeachment authority are self-defining, such as the
supermajority vote for conviction in the Senate, such that it is easy
for the Senate to know what it must do at a minimum in order to
convict an impeached official and avoid obvious controversy.
IV. THE RANGE OF NONJUSTICIABLE IMPEACHMENT
CHALLENGES AFTER NIXON

This Part addresses three matters arguably involving justiciable
impeachment challenges that are likely to arise in the future. Each
claim implicates the significance of the Constitution's allocation of
unique impeachment authority to Congress. The first involves the
question of whether the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause150

hold nonjusticiable a question of statutory interpretation in a statute passed to implement
part of an agreement between Japan and the United States); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981) (reaching merits of dispute over legality of President Carter's executive agreement for the release of United States hostages in Iran); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (invalidating President Truman's seizure of the
nation's steel mills despite his claim that national emergency justified the seizure); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (reaching merits of congressional delegation of power to the President to prohibit sale of arms to countries engaged
in armed conflicts).
150. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause provides in pertinent part: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...."
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applies to the impeachment process, and if so, whether its violation is justiciable. The second is whether the Senate's adoption
and subsequent failure to comply with express rules of evidence or
a uniform burden of proof for impeachment trials is justiciable.
The third is whether a presidential impeachment trial presents a
special case requiring judicial review of any procedural irregularities.
A. The Justiciability of Impeachment Challenges Based on Arguable Violations of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
Although the Senate followed the same procedures in removing Alcee Hastings from a federal district judgeship as it did in
removing Nixon, Hastings challenged his removal from office in
part on the grounds that the Senate's failure to conduct his entire
hearing before the full body of the Senate violated the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.151 Simply put, his argument
was that he had a property interest in keeping his judgeship and
salary and that the government could not deprive him of these in
an impeachment trial without due process, i.e., without following
the proper procedures, including a complete trial before the full
Senate.152
To be sure, Nixon did not consider this issue because Nixon
did not raise it. One could argue that the only justiciable challenges to the impeachment process are for violations of explicit constraints, and might disagree over the applicability of the Due Process Clause to impeachment, but might concur that if the Clause
properly applied, then its violation would be justiciable. Those
reading Nixon as indicating that no impeachment challenge is
justiciable would argue that even if the Due Process Clause ap-

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. See Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 504-05 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
Hastings's impeachment trial unconstitutional because, inter alia, it violated Fifth Amend·
ment Due Process Clause), vacated, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993) {full opinion unpublished), available at 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11592 (remanding case for reconsideration in
light of Nixon). On remand, the district court reluctantly dismissed the case without explicitly readdressing the due process claim. Hastings v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 3, 5
(DD.C. 1993) ("As strongly as this Court believes that Judge Hastings' fundamental
rights were violated, the Court recognizes that the Nixon decision compels that Judge
Hastings' case be dismissed."). But see BERGER, supra note 13, at 120-21 {defending ap·
plicability of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to impeachment process).
152. Hastings v. United States Senate, Impeachment Trial Comm., 716 F. Supp. 38,
39~1 (D.D.C. 1989).
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plied to impeachments, any violation of it would not be justiciable.
The latter argument is bolstered by the Court's observation in
Nixon that "opening the door of judicial review to the procedures
used by the Senate in trying impeachments would 'expose the
political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.' "153 Even so, the central question remains about the applicability and justiciability of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause in the impeachment context.
In spite of what appears to be the plain meaning of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, its application to impeachments
is unclear. For one thing, its language, upon further inspection, is
not so plainly applicable to the unique context of an impeachment.
The Clause explicitly provides that no "person" shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, whereas
the impeachment process expressly concerns only the President,
the Vice President, and "Officers of the United States." 154 The
primary purpose of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was
to guarantee procedural protections for private citizens against
coercive, arbitrary governmental action.155 In contrast, the impeachment process is not directed at government actors in their
private capacities.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Clause requires certain procedural protections in limited circumstances
against the arbitrary dismissal of low-level governmental employees,156 impeachment is directed at a different class of higher-level
governmental officials. An impeachment proceeding is a unique
forum in which Congress may demand a public accounting of the
misbehavior of one of an elite set of officials. The question in

153. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. a. 732, 739 (1993) (quoting Nixon v. United
States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
154. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4.
155. See Leonard G. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 1048, 1068-{)9 (1968). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra uote 12, § 132
(describing judicial construction of "Life, Liberty or Property"); Charles E. Shattuck, The
True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Libeny, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1891) (discussing origins and meaning of due process clauses of state and federal constitutions).
156. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 12, § 13.4, at 510 (suggesting that "if in
dismissing the employee, the government also forecloses the individual's possible employment in a wide range of activities in both the public and private sectors, this dismissal
will constitute a deprivation of liberty sufficient to require that the individual be granted
a fair hearing").
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such a proceeding is whether an impeachable officer is fit to preserve the public trust and therefore to remain in office. In other
words, impeachment is a special disciplinary mechanism for special
officials. The specific procedural protections given to the subjects
of an impeachment are spelled out in the Constitution, including
the division of impeachment authority between the House and the
Senate and the requirements that senators act under oath, that the
Chief Justice preside in presidential impeachment trials, and that
at least two-thirds of the senators present agree in order to convict.157 Treating impeachments as sui generis is consistent with
the absence of any evidence that the Fifth Amendment, including
the Due Process Clause, was ever intended to apply to the impeachment process.158
The argument against applying the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause to impeachment proceedings, however, seems
forced. By its plain terms, the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause forbids Congress from depriving a "person" of "life, liberty,
or property without due process of law;" it is not a stretch to
think that the impeachment process, which seeks to deprive someone of his current and perhaps future office, could easily constitute
a form of property. Moreover, the fact that the Fifth Amendment
postdates the impeachment clauses makes irrelevant any of the
Framers' or ratifiers' original desires regarding the federal impeachment process. The point of an amendment is to change what
came before and that could logically cover the impeachment process no matter how special it was conceived to be.
Even if the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applied to
the impeachment context, though, it is not likely that it would
mandate anything different from the procedures otherwise required. The argument supporting application of the Due Process
Clause to the impeachment process maintains in part that a federal
judge has a property interest in his position. Yet, a property interest for purposes of the Due Process Glause is defined as an entitlement or expectation based on federal law.159 For example, a
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
158. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the different procedural guarantees of
the Fifth Amendment, such as the prohibition against self-incrimination should be treated
differently for purposes of determining their applicability to the impeachment process.
Consequently, the argument against applying the Due Process Clause to the impeachment
process also precludes applying any of the other procedural guarantees of the Fifth
Amendment to impeachment trials.
159. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972}; see NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
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federal judge assumes office under the conditions for removal as
spelled out in the Constitution.160 In other words, a federal judge
has life tenure unless and until he is removed from office in a
constitutionally permissible manner, including impeachment under
the special procedures spelled out in the text.161 Thus, the Impeachment Trial Gause conceivably clarifies the reach of the Due
Process Clause, in spite of the latter's subsequent enactment, because the former arguably defines what process is due in a judicial
removal.
It is also not likely that the Due Process Gause would constrain the Senate's discretion to conduct impeachment trials any
more than does the term "try." The Nixon Court observed, for
example, that the fact that the Framers set out specific limitations
applicable only to impeachments confirms "that the Framers did
not intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the
Senate proceedings by the use of the word 'try.' " 162 The point is
that where the Framers wanted to ensure specific constraints on
the procedure used by the Senate for trying impeachments, they
spelled them out in the Constitution. The process that is due in an
impeachment trial consists of the explicit constitutional requirements set forth in the document. Otherwise, the Senate has
nonreviewable discretion to conduct its hearings as it prefers.
There is no evidence to suggest that at the time the Constitution
was amended to include the Bill of Rights, the Framers intended
either to revise their prior position of spelling out explicitly in the
text the required procedures for impeachments or to add any
other specific procedural requirements for impeachments to those
set forth in the original Constitution.163 Thus, the Due Process
Clause does not constrain congressional discretion any more or
differently than does the Impeachment Trial Clause.

supra note 12, § 13.5, at 513-16.
160. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 1.
161. ld. art. II, § 4. See generally Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove
Federal Judges? A Constitlllional Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 215-22 (1993) (describing the Framers' rejection of political removal mechanisms other than impeachment
and describing judicial self-regulation).
162. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 736 (1993).
163. See Arthur Bestor, Impeachment, 49 WASH. L. REv. 255, 268 (1973) (reviewing
BERGER, supra note 13).
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The Justiciability of Challenges to the Senate's Failure to Follow Rules of Evidence or a Uniform Burden of Proof

Another difficulty left unanswered by Nixon is whether the
Senate's adoption of and subsequent failure to comply with specific rules of evidence or a uniform burden of proof for impeachment trials is justiciable. This problem raises two interrelated questions: (1) whether the Senate has the power to tie its hands in this
manner, and if so, (2) whether such conduct on the part of the
Senate amounts to a waiver of the insulation or immunity from judicial review its procedural decisions otherwise enjoy to the extent
recognized in Nixon. Each of these issues in tum raises special
concerns.
There are, in fact, two practical problems with the Senate's
ability to bind each individual senator in an impeachment trial to
follow certain rules of evidence or a uniform burden of proof.
First, to the extent that such uniform standards deprive any senators from reaching the kind of final judgments they prefer in an
impeachment trial, they may undermine the constitutional requirement of a supermajority of at least two-thirds of the Senate concurring in order to convict. This restriction sought to protect the
subjects of impeachment trials from capricious abuse of impeachment authority and from the tyranny of a partisan majority; it
guaranteed that convictions could occur only if a significant minority of senators did not object.164 Any rule adopted by a majority
of the Senate that frustrates the constitutionally authorized ability
of a minority-i.e., one-third-of the Senate to defeat an impeachment conviction is suspect. An attempt by the majority of the
Senate, through the adoption of set evidentiary rules or a burden
of proof, to deprive individual senators of the power that normally
belongs to a third of the body in impeachment trials to bar convictions likely would be unconstitutional.
Second, although a majority of the Senate has the formal
power to change the procedural rules for an impeachment trial,165 the Senate traditionally permits the implementation of
changes in its procedural rules only if it has unanimous consent to
do so.166 The significance of this practice is that it is incon164. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 96, at 102-06.
165. S. Res. 479, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (enacted).
166. As one commentator has noted,
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ceivable that the full Senate ever would agree to adopt a uniform
standard of proof or set rules of evidence. Indeed, a basic principle recognized in every impeachment trial conducted thus far is
that each senator must ultimately decide for himself on which
rules of evidence or burden of proof to apply.167 Moreover, it is
difficult to . conceive how such uniform standards could ever be
enforced. In recognition of this impossibility, the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal decided to forgo recommending that the Senate adopt a uniform burden of proof.168
The Commission did recommend, however, that the Senate
adopt set rules of evidence.169 If the Senate ever succeeded in
modifyiug its impeachment rules and practices to require the application of uniform rules of evidence (or, for that matter, a set burden of proof) in impeachment trials, the critical question would be
whether such an action would constitute a waiver of the Senate's
immunity from judicial review as recognized in Nixon. The settlement of this issue depends on whether the Senate has the power
to waive its constitutional immunity from judicial review.
On the one hand, several factors argue against the existence
of such power. These include the Framers' distrust of judges and
consequent decision-changeable only by constitutional amendment-to exclude them as decisionmakers in the impeachment
process;170 the weakening of impeachment as a check against executive and especially judicial abuse of power; the conflicts of
interest judges would have in overseeing the only constitutionally
recognized process for their removal; and the difficulties judicial
review would pose with respect to finality and fashioning appropriate relief.
On the other hand, in the context of administrative law, the
Supreme Court has declared that "judicial review of a final agency
action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is

Both houses also have the option of setting aside particular rules, or creating
entirely new ones, by unanimous consent. This device is especially popular in
the Senate, where standing rules and precedents exist to control the practice. Of
course, even those rules can always be set aside by unanimous consent.
Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Political Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1341, 1345 {1990) (citations omitted).
167. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 60 {1993).
168. ld.
169. ld. at 57.
170. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."171 In other words, if a lawmaking body or administrative
agency were really interested in barring judicial review of certain
actions or proceedings, it may do so only if it issues a "clear statement" of that wish. 172 Under these circumstances, courts ask for
a "clear statement" because they want to be sure about precisely
how much power Congress has delegated to some politically unaccountable body. H the Senate's adoption of evidentiary or burden
of proof rules were construed as the functional equivalent of a
legislative or administrative act undertaken for the purpose of giving up some of the Senate's discretion in impeachment trials, then
waiving nonjusticiability in the impeachment context might be
possible only if there were a "clear statement" to that effect.173
At least one advantage of allowing the Senate to waive nonjusticiability (or to presume nonjusticiability unless there is some

171. ·Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). The Court further stated that
"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent
should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Id. at 141; see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
172. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 597 (1992) ("Judicial review does not prevent the Congress from legislating, but judicial interpretation of
the resulting legislation requires an extraordinarily specific statement on the face of the
statute for Congress to limit the states or the executive department."). The number of
areas in which the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have required Congress to issue "clear
statements" if it intends to displace "structural constitutional protections, especially those
of federalism," is widespread. Id. For example, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985), the Court concluded that "Congress may abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court [by virtue of the Eleventh
Amendment] only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute."
173. In Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), the Supreme Court recognized a significant exception to this rule. The Court held that the decision of the Central Intelligence
Agency to discharge an employee was so committed to agency discretion as to preclude
judicial review, except for serious constitutional questions. Id. at 601. The Court based its
holding in part on a tradition of treating the hiring or firing of employees as being with·
in an agency's nonreviewable discretion and on there thus being "no law to apply"-i.e.,
no legislative or other kind of judicially cognizable legal standard to restrict the agency's
discretion. Id. at 599 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410). In
dissent, Justice Scalia went further to find constitutional questions precluded as well. Id.
at 608-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If tradition and separation of powers concerns led the
Court in Webster to bar judicial review of an agency decision, it is possible that similar
factors could lead the Court to bar judicial review of an impeachment proceeding in spite
of the Senate's failure to comply with certain procedural rules or to allow judicial review
only if the Senate waived nonjusticiability by issuing a clear statement of its desire to do
so.
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clear statement to the contrary) is to make it easier for it to use
set evidentiary rules or a uniform burden of proof by not treating
either as legally binding in that noncompliance would not justify
legal sanctions. Such deference seems particularly appropriate in
the impeachment context, in which the adoption of set procedures
for impeachment trials is likely to work to the advantage of all the
participants by providing predictable and consistent practices or
standards. Moreover, judicial deference makes sense in light of the
Nixon Court's reasonable concerns that "opening the door of judicial review" to impeachments is likely to produce uncertainty as to
the "finality" of impeachment decisions174 and potentially intractable problems of "fashioning [appropriate] relief." 175
Obviously, a lot turns on which presumption of judicial review
is appropriate in this context. One possible view is that because
judicial review of impeachment trials normally is thought not to be
permissible, it should be presumed impermissible unless the Senate
issues a clear statement of its intent to subject its compliance with
certain procedural rules to judicial review. Another approach suggests that impeachment proceedings are usually nonjusticiable,
unless they violate express constitutional limits. In other words, if
violations of express constraints are justiciable, the question is
whether set evidentiary rules or a uniform burden of proof constitute such limits, and if so, are similarly justiciable. One simple
way to resolve this conundrum would be for the Senate, at the appropriate time, to state clearly its intent to retain or to preclude
judicial review-whichever it prefers-of its compliance with set
evidentiary rules or a uniform burden of proof.
C.

The Nonjusticiability of Challenges to Deficiencies in Presidential Impeachments

A presidential impeachment trial poses many of the same
problems encountered in judicial impeachments as well as offering

174. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 739 (1993). For example, it is safe to say
that the political turmoil likely to result in the interim in which a President is contesting
his removal would probably not be affected by the Senate's decision to adopt or forgo
set rules of evidence or a uniform standard of proof.
175. ld. Even if it could be established that there were violations of set rules of evidence or a uniform burden of proof, it is unclear, as the Nixon Court recognized, what a
court could legitimately order "other than simply setting aside the judgment of conviction." ld. For example, it is not even clear whether a harmless error rule would apply.
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more dramatic illustrations of the constitutional foundations for
precluding judicial review of the federal impeachment process. I
explore below the problems with judicial review of any aspect of a
presidential impeachment trial.
1. The Difficulty of Devising Proper Judicial Remedies. Sometimes it is difficult to devise a judicial remedy for a violation of an
explicit constraint. For example, the Constitution provides that
"[w]hen the President of the United States is tried, the Chief
Justice shall preside."176 At first glance, the Chief Justice's failure
to preside over a President's impeachment trial is a constitutional
violation, which arguably may justify judicial review in a way similar to the Court's intervention in Powell to ensure that an explicit
textual constraint has not been ignored.
·
Yet, the situation is more complex than it seems. Imagine
further that before the President's impeachment trial is about to
begin, the Chief Justice dies or claims a conflict of interest precluding his participation; or, after the trial begins, the Chief Justice
refuses to participate further to protest what he views as an unconstitutional Senate procedure. 177 It is unlikely that the Senate
would delay the President's impeachment trial so that it could
consider confirmation of a person he has appointed as Chief Justice, who would then preside over his impeachment trial. Thus, it
is quite probable that there would be no Chief Justice to preside
over the presidential impeachment trial.
Under such circumstances, one could argue that the provision
mandating that the Chief Justice preside over a presidential impeachment trial has been violated but that the violation is meaningless, if, for example, the most senior Associate Justice were to
preside instead. Judicial review seems pointless here, because it
would lead to outrageous results, compounded by further delays in
the impeachment trial, causing substantial domestic and foreign
confusion over who should be President of the United States. For
example, the courts might order the Senate to schedule a confirmation hearing on a matter it seems to have the constitutional

176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
177. One could suppose, for example, that the Senate designates a special committee.
to do factfinding for a presidential impeachment trial and asks the Chief Justice to preside over that committee's proceedings. The Chief Justice may declare the trial
committee's proceedings unconstitutional, and if overruled by the Senate, refuse to participate further, perhaps pending interlocutory appeal.
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prerogative to plan as it sees fit, or it might order the President to
appoint a Chief Justice that the Senate sooner or later would have
to confirm (if it wanted to move forward) when it might be in the
President's interest to delay the appointment as long as possible.
These judicial orders would involve the courts in making or directing policy choices committed by the Constitution to political actors, and they are not as likely to preserve constitutional stability
as to allow Congress and the President work out a mutually satisfactory settlement.
2. The Omnipresent Need for Finality, Especially in Presidential Impeachments. If the Senate were to use a special committee
to do factfinding for a presidential impeachment trial, there would
be two conceivable arguments supporting justiciability. The first is
that the President is entitled to a trial before the full Senate because of the clause stating that the Chief Justice "shall preside" at
his impeachment trial. 178 This is a dubious basis to justify a full
trial, however, given Nixon's holding that the Senate is the final
arbiter of impeachment trial procedures.179
The second argument is that the President has a special constitutional status that entitles him to a particular kind of impeachment trial. This argument is supported by the mandate that the
Chief Justice preside over a presidential impeachment trial. Nevertheless, the need for finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief
counsel against justiciability. As the Court observed in Nixon,
there would be considerable domestic and foreign strife "if the
President were impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and
hence his effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely
while the judicial process was running its course, but during any
retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its
first judgment of conviction were invalidated."180 Even five seconds of uncertainty about who is properly the President of the
United States would put national security at risk.
The reason for the uncertainty would be that there is no legitimate basis for a federal court to claim jurisdiction over a
President's impeachment trial. To begin with, in the midst of debating the Supreme Court's jurisdiction on August 27, 1787, the

178. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
179. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735-40.
180. Id. at 739.
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Constitutional Convention delegates "dropped 'impeachment' altogether from the list which later became, by stylistic revision, the
list defining the Article III 'judicial power.' "181 After initially
agreeing to postpone considering whether to extend Supreme
Court jurisdiction to "the trial of impeachments of officers of the
United States," 182 the delegates considered the appropriate
phrase or clause for accurately describing or designating the scope
of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Madison "doubted whether it
was not going too far to extend the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising Under the Constitution, & whether it ought
not to be limited to cases of a Judiciary nature.'' 183 After another delegate, Dr. Johnson, suggested "that the jurisdiction given [in
the former phrase] was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature," 184 the delegates agreed to postpone consideration of
extending the Court's jurisdiction "in cases of impeachment." 185
The critical aspect of this debate is that it occurred in the
midst of the delegates' consideration of which cases, for whatever
reason, would fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Framers took great pains to set forth as precisely as possible
the kinds of cases they anticipated would fall properly within the
Court's jurisdiction-those "of a Judiciary nature," as both Madison and Dr. Johnson put it. Not surprisingly, given that the Framers never regarded impeachments as constituting such cases, they
balked at the prospect of including either "the trial of impeachments of officers of the United States" or "cases of impeachment"
\vithin the original or appellate matters that would fall within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The fact that the Framers understood that they would have
had to make special mention of impeachments as falling within
federal court jurisdiction in any manner makes complete sense,
given that judicial participation in the impeachment process had
always been explicitly provided for in other jurisdictions with
which they were familiar and that judicial review of impeachments
would have deviated from the prevailing practice of their times.
That the Framers declined to make the extension tracked the com-

181. BLACK, supra note 13, at 57 (citations omitted).
182. 2 RECORDS OF TilE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, s11pra note 118, at 430.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 431.
185. Id.
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mon understanding that unless there were an explicit statement in
the Constitution to the contrary, impeachments would remain, as
they had always been up until then, cases of a unique nature not
subject to judicial review.
Moreover, the Supreme Court could claim authority over a
presidential impeachment trial only if it had original or appellate
jurisdiction over impeachments. The Court does not, however,
have original jurisdiction over any kind of suit seeking to overturn
a senatorial directive removing the President.186
It is also implausible that the Court has appellate jurisdiction
over impeachments. The most likely portion of Article III granting
the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over impeachments is
that which covers "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution ...." 187 The words "Law" and "Equity" are terms
of art, referring to the two kinds of regular judicial courts in England and the United States at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.188 Impeachments are not technically in "Law" or
"Equity."189 This construction is consistent with the underlying
purpose of Article III, which has to do with regular judicial business in ordinary courts of law, except for a passage making it clear
that jury trial is to play no part in impeachment.190 This latter
provision was left in Article III when the Framers shifted responsibility for impeachment trials from the Supreme Court to the Senate, and therefore to Article I, dealing with the legislative
branch.191 The Framers left this provision in place because its
main purpose was to set forth a general rule of trial by jury,
which logically belonged in the judiciary article, and they left in
the reservation on impeachments to avoid any misunderstanding.
In short, the inclusion of the term "impeachment" in Article III
does not establish that impeachment is in any way an Article III
matter.192
186. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
187. ld. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
188. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 5#-45 (1928).
189. Cf. WILSON, supra note 132, at 426 (describing impeachments as proceedings of a
political nature, "confined to political characters," charging only "political crimes and
misdemeanors," and culminating only in "political punishments").
190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
191. See BLACK, s11pra note 13, at 56.
192. Another possible argument precluding judicial review of impeachments is that
Congress, which has the power to "make" "[e]xceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2., has excepted snch appellate review by
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3. The Unrealistic Need for Judicial Review. To some, all of
the difficulties with judicial review of impeachments might argue in
favor of allowing it only in the most extreme cases-i.e., some
would argue that only the most minimal judicial review, around
the outermost edges (however defined) of the process, makes
sense. Otherwise, the Court needs to be prepared even in the case
of a deviation from an explicit constraint to balance the need for
judicial review against its effect on constitutional stability.
The counterargument to this contention is that it premises
judicial review on an unrealistic basis. This is an appropriate attitude to adopt in determining the propriety of judicial intervention.193 The history of the federal impeachment power shows, for
example, that even when attendance and preparation for an impeachment trial in the Senate have been poor, most senators have
taken seriously (at least at the time they cast their final votes) the
consequences of a conviction and have never considered failing to
comply with-much less taken any steps toward violating-any of
the explicit constitutional constraints on their power to try impeachments.194 The fact that members of Congress have never
not providing for it in any statutes governing appeals to the Court. This contention is
problematic for two reasons. First, interpreting Congress's failure to provide jurisdiction
over impeachments to be an exception to appellate jurisdiction is risky. For example, it is
plausible to construe Congress's failure as leaving intact the Court's appellate jurisdiction
that otherwise exists (assuming that impeachment review does not fit within the language
of any statute governing such jurisdiction). Second, Congress's power to except impeachment from appellate review presumably enables Congress to provide for such review if it
so desires. This possibility raises a related question about whether Congress would then
have the power to waive nonjusticiability. The resolution of this latter issue turns on the
same factors as determining whether the Senate may waive the rule of nonjusticiability
set forth in Nixon by adopting but not complying with particular procedural rules. See
supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text. In any event, it would have been a waste of
time and effort for the Framers to have given Congress the powers to impeach and to
make exceptions to appellate jurisdiction over impeachments, because they then would
have enabled Congress to undo their decision to move impeachment trials out of the
Supreme Court and into the Senate. It seems odd that the Framers would have gone to
all this trouble without mentioning that their decision could be reconsidered and overturned at any time by Congress.
193. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 217 (1882):
Hypothetical cases of great evils may be suggested by a particularly fruitful
imagination in regard to almost every law upon which depend the rights of the
individual or of the government, and if the existence of laws is to depend upon
their capacity to withstand such criticism, the whole fabric of the law must fail.
Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 183
(1980) ("[C]onstitutional law appropriately exists for those situations where representative
government cannot be trusted, not those where we know it can.").
194. See generally ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE
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conducted an impeachment proceeding in violation of any explicit
restraint on the process shows the degree to which those constraints, including the public pressure placed on Congress during
an impeachment, have achieved their desired effect.
Because they are so unlike anything actually ever tried in an
impeachment, hypotheticals about tossing coins or the Chief
Justice's failure to preside over a presidential impeachment trial do
not supply reasonable bases for building reliable understandings of
the justiciability of impeachment challenges. As Judge Stephen
Williams observed in his opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Nixon,
If the Senate should ever be ready to abdicate its responsibilities
to schoolchildren, or, moved by Caligula's appointment of his
horse as senator, to an elephant from tlte National Zoo, the republic will have sunk to depths from which no court could rescue
it. And if the senators try to ignore the clear requirement of a
two-thirds vote for conviction, they will have to contend with
public outrage tltat will ultimately impose its sanction at the
ballot box. Absent judicial review, tlte Senate takes sole responsibility for its impeachment procedures as a full-fledged constitutional actor, just as the framers intended. 195

Given media scrutiny and party divisions, it is difficult to conceive
how members of Congress would ever get away with violating an
explicit constraint on the impeachment power, especially in an
event as closely watched as a presidential impeachment. In short,
the unlikelihood that Congress will ever violate an explicit constraint on its impeachment power196 conveys something important
about the continued effectiveness of current restraints and the
similarly remote possibility that judicial review of the violation of
an explicit constraint on impeachment would remedy the level of
corruption or malfeasance that caused such a breach.

FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS (1992) (describing impeachment trials of 15 judges and
other public officials). Of course, the plaintiff in Nixon regarded the term "try" as such a
constraint, which was violated by the Senate's use of a trial committee. The Court
claimed, however, that the impossibility of developing a clear, enforceable judicial construction of the word differentiated it from the explicit constraints on impeachment. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 736, 740 (1993).
195. Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (1991) (footnote omitted), affd, 113 S.
Ct. at 732.
196. Cf. id. at 246 n.2 ("We need not decide [the permissibility of judicial review of
the Senate's violation of an explicit constraint on its impeachment power], so we leave it
for the unlikely day of its arising.").
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CONCLUSION

Nixon opened the way for better understanding of the connection between impeachments and the political question doctrine. On
the one hand, it is clear after Nixon not only that the political
question doctrine remains viable but also that it does so because it
is based on constitutional text, structure, and history, as well as on
prudent considerations about the consequences of judicial review.
Moreover, in applying the doctrine to judicial impeachments, the
Court in Nixon made a forceful statement about its own limits,
that federal judges have no authority to review the procedures by
which the Constitution permits their removal from office, and that
there is not a judicial remedy for every conceivable constitutional
violation.197
On the other hand, the Nixon Court left Congress with
nonreviewable authority to make pivotal decisions about its preferred procedures for removing some of our most important federal officials. This prospect unsettles many pe9ple, who trust largely,
if not exclusively, in the Court to make constitutional law. In
other words, Nixon tells us that Congress too may make constitutional law. Of course, whether Congress has the authority to make
judgments about the Constitution in the area of impeachment that
are final vis-a-vis the other branches is a different issue from how
well it makes constitutional law. Yet, it is fair to say that whatever
one thinks of Nixon, the Court merely remained silent about
something that has been going on without judicial review since the
beginning of the republic. The fact that many constitutional law
scholars were eager to end this practice says a great deal about
their faith in judicial review. After Nixon, the time has come for
these same people to (re )consider their faith in the Framers who
did not trust any judicial involvement with the administration of
the federal impeachment process.

197. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87-88 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (arguing that "(c]ourts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have
the capacity to govern" and rejecting the "assumption that the responsibility for the preservation of our institutions is the exclusive concern of any one of the three branches of
government, or that it alone can save them from destruction").

